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What is the state of individual freedom in the United States today?
How fully have the majestic promises of the Declaration of Indepen-
dence been realized? No doubt Americans have experienced vast
changes in the relationship between the individual and government
over the past half century. The compassionate energy of Franklin
Roosevelt, the terrors of cold war McCarthyism, the call to progress of
the Kennedy brothers, the moral force of Martin Luther King Jr., the
activism of the Warren Court and the Great Society, the abuses of
Richard Nixon, the ambivalence of the Burger Court, and a first term
of Ronald Reagan all have left their marks. By any standard, guaran-
tees of liberty and equality have undergone major expansions. Yet con-
stitutional protection is hardly a static process. New problems arise, '
old ones are resurrected.2 Even in the Orwellian year of 1984, all of
our constitutional crises cannot be considered behind us.
Our Endangered Rights. The ACLU Report on Civil Liberties To-
day3 offers both an assessment of the present status of American free-
dom and an examination of perceived future battlegrounds over
individual liberties. Edited by Norman Dorsen, the book is a collection
of essays by noted constitutional authorities and civil liberties experts
measuring the vitality of various constitutional guarantees. It offers a
glimpse not only of the broad panoply of the rights we do enjoy, but
* Professor of Law, University of Florida.
1. See, eg., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (minority set-aside provision in pub-lic contracts).
2. See, ag., Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978) (resurrection of the
contracts clause).
3. OUR ENDANGERED RIGHTS: THE ACLU REPORT ON CIVIL LIBERTIES TODAY (N. Dor-
sen ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as OuR ENDANGERED RIOHTS].
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also what Dorsen calls the "darker side ' 4 of the human rights equation
in this country. Authors characterize the birthright of freedom for all
Americans as "continually under siege,"'5 and the title of the work is
said to sum up well the present situation. Past civil liberties victories
are now "endangered" and future technological developments pose un-
foreseen perils to individual autonomy. The social agenda of the New
Right, the use of executive authority by the Reagan administration,
and continuing economic scarcity threaten traditional movements to-
wards toleration and equality. In short, progress on the civil liberties
front cannot be assured. As we approach the close of the twentieth
century, efforts to secure fundamental freedoms in both legislative and
judicial arenas must, if anything, be redoubled.
There is much that is good in Our Endangered Rights. In particu-
lar, Professor Emerson's chapter on academic freedom outlines signifi-
cant applications of constitutional law to protect the rights of faculty
members and students and, more recently, to assure a measure of cur-
ricular diversity.6 More importantly, he argues that government at-
tempts to control information on national security grounds and the
commercial exploitation of academic research constitute threats to true
academic liberty that are at least as great as more direct means of con-
trol.7 The former serves to diminish the information needed by the
public to participate in decision making, and the latter is at odds with
the academic community's traditional commitment to the free and un-
skewed pursuit of knowledge. Norman Redlich carefully examines the
mounting pressures placed on Madison's wall separating church and
state in an era of renewed religious fundamentalism 8-pressures that
have hardly decreased since publication of the book.9 Stanley N.
Katz's concluding chapter lends a refreshing historical perspective to
civil liberties struggles which, by their very fervor, tend to eschew rela-
tivism.10 By reminding us that future civil rights battles must be con-
ducted without the support of a unified traditional New Deal political
coalition, Katz makes clear that the issues of the eighties are not the
4. Dorsen, Introduction, in OUR ENDANGERED RIGHTS, supra note 3, at ix, ix.
5. Id
6. Emerson, Academic Freedom, in OUR ENDANGERED RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 179, 179.
7. Id at 194-200.
8. Redlich, Reiigious Liberty, in OUR ENDANGERED RIGHTs, supra note 3, at 259, 259.
9. Since publication, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a municipality's
Christmas creche in Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984). The United States Senate also
considered, and rejected, a "school prayer" amendment to the Constitution. See S.J. Res. 73, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. S2425 (daily ed. March 8, 1984) (proposing an amendment relat-
ing to voluntary school prayer).
10. Katz, An HistoricalPerspective on Crises in Civil Liberties, in OUR ENDANGERED RIGHTS,
supra note 3, at 311, 311.
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issues of the sixties. Accordingly, his chapter proves to be an effective
counterweight to the often unbalanced tone of other selections.
The book, in a variety of ways, documents both the logical incon-
sistency 1 and general undesirability 2 of recent attempts to roll back
long established constitutional guarantees. Measures to withdraw the
jurisdiction of the federal courts or to legalize orchestrated school
prayer, for example, get ample attention. But perhaps the strongest sin-
gle feature of Our Endangered Rights is its effort to signal flash points of
future constitutional controversy that existing bodies of law are ill-
suited to handle.
Professor Bender, for example, argues that although the Constitu-
tion has been interpreted to protect individual privacy in some particu-
lars, "meaningful protection of informational privacy rights at present
• ..largely depends upon the good faith and vigilance. . . of govern-
mental and private agencies .... ,,13 Given the virtual explosion of
technologies available to obtain and compile information, constitu-
tional silence will become increasingly difficult to maintain. Further, as
Morton Halperin argues, the traditional judicial deference accorded to
presidential claims of national security may well insulate much mis-
chief.'4 Recent executive branch efforts to limit foreign travel, to bar
foreign visitors, to stigmatize various publications, and to censor for-
mer government officials bode ill for a robust national debate on for-
eign affairs.15 John Shattuck makes an analogous point concerning
executive authority and domestic affairs.' 6 Reagan administration
moves to curtail civil rights enforcement and to alter existing civil
rights policies through executive order have proven relatively impervi-
ous to attack.17 Finally, in a perceptive essay, Sylvia Law demonstrates
11. Shattuck, Congress and the Legislative Process, in OUR ENDANGERED RIGHTS, supra note
3, at 46, 53. Shattuck criticizes the Reagan administration's position in City of Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983) (calling for deference to local govern-
ments in abortion cases) as inconsistent with Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
12. Shattuck similarly discusses jurisdiction-stripping legislation, antibusing legislation, anti-
abortion legislation, and acts to abolish the exclusionary rule and limit habeas corpus review.
Shattuck, Congress andthe Legislative Process, in OUR ENDANGERED RIGHTS, suvpra note 3, at 46,
46-67.
13. Bender, Privacy, in OUR ENDANGERED RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 237, 251.
14. Halperin, National Security, in OUR ENDANGERED RGHTS, supra note 3, at 281, 286-92.
15. Id at 290-92.
16. Shattuck, Congress and the Legislative Process, in OUR ENDANGERED RIGHTS, supra note
3, at 46, 60-67.
17. Id at 65-67. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1982) (granting CIA new
authority to conduct surveillance inside the United States); Exec. Order 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166
(1983) (classifying information held by executive agencies); Civil Rights Enforcement for Federal
Contractors, 47 Fed. Reg. 17,770 (1982) (to be codified at 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-1, 60-2, 60-4, 60-30)
(cutting back affirmative action guidelines for federal contractors). But see Bob Jones Univ. v.
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the inseparability of civil liberties and economic justice. Once fusion of
the two concepts is accomplished, the need to recognize not only cer-
tain claims for subsistence but, at the other end of the spectrum, to
render concentrations of economic power democratically accountable
becomes clear. 8 Law's arguments remind us of the continuing validity
of Franklin Roosevelt's assertion that political equality can all too eas-
ily be rendered "meaningless in the face of economic inequality."' 19
None of these flash points is apt to be brought under the umbrella of
constitutional protection overnight. Each author, however, makes a
strong case that presently asserted constitutional values cannot be in-
definitely maintained if such important areas of friction are ignored.
Despite these strengths, however, Our Endangered Rights ulti-
mately provides something less than its advertised claim: "a lucid re-
view of the state of American freedom."20 In no small part its
shortcomings result from defects common to much liberal discourse.
Accordingly, they merit attention.
I. ON LIBERAL HYPERBOLE
It is not uncommon in constitutional scholarship to attempt to
make things more complicated than they are.21 It is not uncommon in
politics to attempt to make things more simple than they are. Much of
Our Endangered Rights, although under the rubric of constitutional
analysis, follows the latter theme.
Consider a few examples. Much has been written22-no doubt too
much 23-concerning the antidemocratic nature of judicial review.
However one feels about that debate, it is difficult to deny, for example,
that the judicial enforcement of nontextual substantive rights against
popularly elected branches of government is at odds with democratic
theory. Professor Neuborne, nevertheless, dismisses such claims by ar-
guing that "allowing judges to check. . . a powerful transient minority
in the name of an existing consensus concerning individual rights is
United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983) (affirming IRS decision denying tax exemptions to racially
discriminatory private schools).
18. Law, Economic Justice, in OUR ENDANGERED RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 134, 134-59.
19. Address before the Democratic Convention (June 27, 1936).
20. This claim appeared on the cover of the paperback edition.
21. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLYpassim (1978) (discussing the philos-
ophies of individual rights, and criticizing the "ruling theory of law" as espoused by Jeremy
Bentham).
22. See generally, eg., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977); Rehnquist, The No-
tion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REV. 693, 704-06 (1976).
23. See generally Nichol, Giving Substance Its Due (Book Review), 93 YALE L.J. 171 (1983).
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hardly a serious challenge to democratic political theory. ' 24 One
could, of course, counter Neuborne's claim by pointing to persuasive
arguments that either there is no discernible consensus on individual
rights to instruct the bulk of modem constitutional decisions, or that
the judiciary is particularly ill-suited to discover it.25 It is perhaps sim-
pler, however, to point out a subsequent paragraph of Professor
Neuborne's: "We turn to judges to define and enforce individual rights
not because no real choices are necessary, but precisely because hard
choices cannot be avoided. ' 26 True enough. But choices are hard pre-
cisely because they are not rooted in societal consensus. Further, it is
my guess that Neuborne would be among the last to advocate that the
judiciary wait for broad popular agreement before protecting, for ex-
ample, the rights of Nazis to march in Skokie or poor women to obtain
government funding for abortions. Rather, arguments for an activist
modern judiciary based upon perceived consensus boil down to the un-
realistic and ethnocentric claim that the bulk of the country sees the
world through the eyes of the political left.
Professors Estrich and Kerr's attack on the gender cases, on the
other hand, is overblown. Michael M. v. Superior Court,27 sustaining
the constitutionality of a California gender-biased statutory rape law, is
indeed a regrettable step backwards in the Supreme Court's treatment
of sex discrimination. The decision's shortcoming is surely not that
"the non-physiological consequences of pregnancy-the 'punishment'
of pregnancy itself as well as the additional constraints that punishment
may place on female sexuality-are socially created, as much the prod-
uct of governmental action as the criminal sanction imposed on
Michael M.' '28 There may be a multitude of causes leading to a teen-
age girl's fear of pregnancy, but government is not on the list. Nor does
it further the understanding of privacy analysis to characterize the
24. Neuborne, The Supreme Court and the Judicial Process, in OUR ENDANGERED RIGHTS,
supra note 3, at 27, 28.
25. See, e.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 63-69 (1980).
26. Neuborne, The Supreme Court and the Judicial Process, in OUR ENDANGERED RIGHTS
supra note 3, at 27, 41.
27. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
28. Estrich & Kerr, Sexual Justice, in OUR ENDANGERED RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 98, 115.
Estrich and Kerr correctly recognize that Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (male-only draft
registration), Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (affirming California statutory
rape law which imposed criminal liability only on men), and Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484
(1974) (upholding state disability scheme excluding pregnancy coverage), reflect a lingering judi-
cial accepta.nce of separate spheres for male and female. Surprisingly, however, they criticize
cases denying custody to lesbian parents because such rulings "devalue the importance and diffi-
culty of the nurturing activity that has been assigned to women." Estrich & Kerr, supra, at 127.
Lingerings are apparently widespread.
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troubling case of Harris v. McRae29 as granting to states the power "to
assert control over the reproductive lives" of poor women.30 Labelling
sensitive human rights disputes as something other than what they are
may indeed ease the decisionmaking process. I doubt, however, that it
leads to better results. Unfortunately, Our Endangered Rights is replete
with such hyperbole. 31
In a perhaps similar vein, the book too often treats difficult consti-
tutional crises as if they were merely problems of motivation. Constitu-
tional cases would be easily decided and civil liberties easily protected
if we just all believed in freedom and progress, or so the theory goes.
In short, you are either for the Constitution or against it.
This theme is reflected in a number of ways. First, the book fre-
quently succumbs to a we/they world view. Ira Glasser, for example,
argues that the future of civil liberties depends not on "what they do;
what counts is what we do in response." 32 The New Right is consist-
ently pictured as a modem-day version of Niebuhr's "children of dark-
ness."' 33 That temptation may be compelling, but it also probably
misreads the appeal of Reaganism to the American people. No doubt
traditionally respected characteristics such as reliance on individual
virtue and industry, fear of centralized government, and belief in the
moral progress of society have much to do with the "new" conserva-
tism. It ill serves liberalism to disregard completely such broadly
shared sentiments.
Nor is it useful to ignore the genuine absence of consensus on
many of the perplexing constitutional issues of the day. Persons of
profound integrity and compassionate outlook can reasonably disagree,
for example, on the propriety of "benign" racial preference or the ex-
clusion of evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment al-
beit in good faith. Nor, in a broader sense, is it possible to maintain a
clearly agreed-upon civil liberties agenda amid rising expectations of
29. 448 U.S. 297 (1980). Harris upheld the Hyde amendment which restricted funding for
medically necessary abortions. The Court subjected the statute, the impact of which fell exclu-
sively on indigent pregnant women, to no more rigorous scrutiny than had been applied in cases
presenting distinctions between economic interests.
30. Estrich & Kerr, Sexual Justice, in OUR ENDANGERED RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 98, 122-23.
31. I will limit myself to a single example: "By late 1980, [the New Right] had achieved
substantial political power. Suddenly, no freedom seemed safe. Book banning became epidemic.
Women's rights were threatened. Homosexuals were attacked. Voting rights were endangered.
And ominous new laws to weaken the federal courts and to breach the separation of church and
state were widely proposed." Glasser, Making Constitutional Rights Worl OUR ENDANGERED
RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 3, 17.
32. Id at 25 (emphasis added).
33. See generally R. NIEBUHR, THE CHILDREN OF LIGHT AND THE CHILDREN OF DARKNESS
(1944).
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civil and economic rights in an era of shrinking available resources.3 4
The explosion of constitutional protection ushered in by the Warren
Court-through its very success-has rendered future progress in the
guarantee of civil liberties a more formidable enterprise. On the one
hand, a sizeable portion of American society has come to see itself as
the victim of the Supreme Court. On the other hand, early victories
often lead to subtler, more persistent problems. It was, for example,
perhaps easier to announce Brown v. Board of Education35 than to
bring its promises to fruition. Brushing such problems aside, Our En-
dangeredRights too often suggests that if we would all stop being bigots
everything would be fine. In reality, of course, most of our present
constitutional problems are sufficiently tenacious that they would likely
remain even if bigotry and ill will were to depart suddenly. Forging
human rights strategies despite these difficulties is the challenge of the
next decade. Painting over complexities does little to further that
process.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CROSSROADS
Our Endangered Rights claims in major part to be an examination
of "where we seem to be heading" 36 in terms of civil liberties protection
in the United States. Despite its often strident tone, an argument can
be made that the book actually understates the extent to which we face
a major constitutional crossroads in the remainder of this decade. One
way or the other, the role of the United States Supreme Court in the
protection of civil liberties is apt soon to undergo a substantial transfor-
mation. The impact of such a shift in judicial perspective on the rights
we enjoy may well be significant.
Recent Supreme Court history bears this out. The Warren Court
accomplished a significant change in the direction of constitutional
decisionmaking. Landmark decisions such as Brown,37 Reynolds v.
Sims,38 Engel v. Vitale,39 and Miranda v. Arizona 40 in effect resurrected
an institution previously rendered silent by its battles with the New
Deal and the revelations of legal realism. The reemergence was ac-
complished primarily on behalf of egalitarianism. Although its vision
was not always articulated, the Warren Court at least behaved as if it
34. Professor Katz makes this observation in the concluding chapter. Katz, An Historical
Perspective on Crises in Civil Liberties, OUR ENDANGERED RIGHTS supra note 3, at 311, 321-23.
35. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
36. Dorsen, Introduction in OUR ENDANGERED RIGHTS, supra note 3, at ix, ix.
37. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
38. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
39. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
40. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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had a clear view of its role in our system of government. Substantially
broadening the participatory base of our democracy, the Warren Court
shook the dust from old tools of judicial activism in an effort to accom-
plish more fully the goal of equal dignity for all. The result, in no
small degree, was the development of an institution that viewed its pri-
mary responsibility as the protection of individual liberties against ma-
jority intrusion.
The Burger Court has been less predictable.4' Its decisions have
hardly reflected the levelling fervor of those of its predecessor. Still, its
record is far from passive. The cornerstones of the Warren Court juris-
prudence remain firmly in place.42 New nontextual rights have been
recognized.43 The electoral process has been aggressively supervised,44
and the Court has shown a surprising willingness to measure the pow-
ers of the legislative and executive branches.45 In short, the Burger
Court has placed itself firmly within the activist tradition more com-
monly associated with its predecessor.
But its activism cannot be as readily ascribed to any particular
view of the Constitution or of judicial authority. Unlike the Warren
Court, the present Court is dominated by centrists. Neither William
Rehnquist and Warren Burger on the one hand, nor William Brennan
and Thurgood Marshall on the other can be considered the heart of the
Burger Court. No particular ideology consistently prevails. The result
has been a marked ambivalence in the civil liberties arena. The "root-
lessness" 46 has manifested itself in two principal ways. First, the Court
has repeatedly been unable to fashion majority opinions in major
human rights cases.47 Second, when it has spoken, the Justices often
41. See generally THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T (V.
Blasi ed. 1983).
42. Blasi, The Rootless Activism of the Burger Court in id at 198, 198-217.
43. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (right to marry); In re Griffiths, 413
U.S. 717 (1973) (rights of aliens); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion rights).
44. See, e.g., First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (protecting, on first amend-
ment grounds, a corporation's right to make expenditures for the purpose of influencing referen-
dum voting); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam) (striking down various sections of
the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended in 1974, as violative of the first
amendment).
45. See, eg., INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983) (striking down provision of Immigration
and Nationality Act that authorized one house of Congress to veto executive's decision to suspend
deportation of an alien); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (prohibiting the
imposition of federal minimum wage provisions on state entities as being violative of the tenth
amendment); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (striking provisions of the Voting Rights
Act Amendments of 1970 establishing the 18-year-old vote in state and local elections).
46. Blasi, The Rootless Activism of the Burger Court, in THE BURGER COURT: THE
COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T, supra note 37, at 198, 21o.
47. See, e.g., Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (three Justices on opinion of the
Court and three concurring Justices) (removal of books from public school libraries); Clements v.
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have tended to construct compromise doctrines rather than make the
fundamental value choices necessitated by the dispute.48 The Court's
decisions concerning the establishment clause,49 affirmative action,50
the rights of aliens, 5' the right to privacy,52 and desegregation reme-
dies53 provide fertile examples. Though the Court apparently has a
strong concept of its power-witness the decision in INS v. Chadha54-
it has been unsure of its posture on civil liberties. Thus the Burger
Fashing, 457 U.S. 957 (1982) (four Justices on the opinion of the Court, one Justice concurring)
(Texas resign-to-run election provisions); Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981)
(four Justices formed the opinion of the Court, one Justice concurred, and one concurred in part
and dissented in part) (commercial speech case); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S.
555 (1980) (five separate concurrences on a first amendment claim); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448
U.S. 448 (1980) (three Justices on the opinion of the Court, three Justices concurring in a separate
opinion) (minority set-asides for government contracts); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55
(1980) (four Justices on the opinion of the Court, two separate concurrences) (voting rights); Laffli
v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (three Justices on the opinion of the Court, one of whom filed a
concurrence, two separate concurrences) (inheritance rights of illegitimate children); Regents of
the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (a four-one-four split with Powell, J. as
the swing vote and delivering the opinion of the Court) (minority quotas for medical school ad-
mission); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (four Justices on the opinion of the Court, four
Justices split among three concurrences) (exclusion of ministers as state legislators); Roemer v.
Board of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (three Justices on the opinion of the Court, two
Justices concurring in a separate opinion) (state aid to sectarian colleges); Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (four Justices on the opinion of the Court, three Justices on two
concurrences) (housing ordinance defining family to exclude certain extended relatives); Lehman
v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (four Justices on the opinion of the Court, one separate
concurrence) (political advertising).
48. Blasi, supra note 41 at 198, 216. See generally also Nichol, OnAmbivalentActvsm (Book
Review), 98 HARV. L. REv. - (forthcoming 1984).
49. Cf. Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984) (allowing the city to construct a Christian
nativity scene); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (prohibiting the posting of the Ten Com-
mandments in public schools); Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (prohibiting state provision
of auxiliary services to nonpublic schools); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (197 1) (prohibiting
a state salary supplement to teachers of secular subjects in nonpublic schools as involving exces-
sive entanglement).
50. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (allowing minority set asides on
government contracts); Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)
(disallowing racial quotas in admission policies when mandated by only the faculty of the school).
51. See, eg., Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (upholding requirement of United
States citizenship for public school teacher certification); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365
(1971) (striking down a durational residency requirement before an alien may qualify for welfare).
52. See Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 436 F. Supp. 1328 (W.D. Pa. 1977), af'd
mere, 578 F.2d 1374 (3rd Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1052 (1978) (upholding employer's
right to dismiss employees living in open adultery); Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F.
Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (upholding sodomy statute regarding homosexual males), aff'dmem.,
425 U.S. 901 (1976).
53. See, e.g., Independent School District v. United States, 429 U.S. 990 (1977) (remanding
for further inquiry a multi-district desegregation plan); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974)
(disallowing a multi-district school desegregation plan).
54. 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983) (holding a portion of the Immigration and Nationality Act
unconstitutional).
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Court has produced a strong activist record without promoting a clear
vision of the role of the Supreme Court in protecting human rights.
The Burger Court era, however, rapidly draws to a close. Five
members of the Court are in their late seventies. A major change of
personnel almost surely awaits the next president. Moreover, it seems
quite unlikely that the next series of justices will be ambivalent about
the role of the Supreme Court in American government. Battle lines
are clearly drawn. A Democratic president, following on the heels of
six Republican appointees, would have felt heavy pressure to select jus-
tices in the egalitarian-activist tradition. For such a court, issues of
economic justice, individual autonomy, racial and sexual discrimina-
tion, and constitutional accountability of the executive branch might
have provided a fruitful agenda.
President Reagan's reelection seems to assure a quite different
course. Depending upon the individuals chosen, a Reagan bench
might be expected to move the Supreme Court in either of two direc-
tions. At the least, it appears likely that a strong majority employing a
true philosophy55 of judicial restraint would be achieved. If the last
Term is any indication, the Burger Court itself has taken a marked turn
in this direction-pursuing deference to other institutions of govern-
ment as the highest value in constitutional adjudication.5 6 Such a
Court exacerbates the dangers to individual liberties presented by a
strong executive or a Congress dominated by the New Right. A work-
ing majority of strong judicial conservatives, in short, would start the
Court on a slow march toward inactivity. The eventual result would
likely be the return of a sleepy federal judiciary similar to that presided
over by Chief Justice Vinson after World War II.
A second course would be even more disturbing. New Justices in
the Rehnquist 7 mold could help comprise an activist Court seeking to
55. The Burger Court has often employed the language ofjudicial restraint. See, e.g., Valley
Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464
(1982) (denial of standing on the basis of absence of injury, thereby supporting executive action).
56. See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 3479, 3490 (1984) (exclusionary rule not
applicable to deportation proceedings); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 104 S. Ct. 3424, 3428 (1984)
(creating an exception to the exclusionary rule where the police are relying on a judicially issued
warrant obtained in good faith); Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group,
104 S. Ct. 3348 (1984) (upholding denial of financial aid to those failing to register for the draft);
Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3329 (1984) (no standing to challenge IRS guidelines to deter-
mine tax exempt status for private schools); Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3200 (1984) (no
privacy interest in prison cell); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 104 S. Ct. 3065,
3069 (1984) (upholding a ban on sleeping in national park against first amendment challenge);
INS v. Delgado, 104 S. Ct. 1758 (1984) (upholding INS factory surveys); Lynch v. Donnelly, 104
S. Ct. 1355, 1356 (1984) (upholding government display of Christian nativity scene).
57. See, for example, Justice Rehnquist's opinions in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Rel. Ass'n; 452 U.S. 264, 307-13 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (commerce clause not applica-
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further conservative political values. Then not only would traditional
civil liberties guarantees be called into question, but the constitutional
protection of, for example, property interests and states's rights could
be reinvigorated. In either case, history may well come to see the Bur-
ger Court as transitional-keeping alive the tools of activism until a
new course is set for judicial authority. If that course incorporates
either a heavy dose of political conservatism or an overriding predilec-
tion for judicial restraint, the civil rights battles of the next generation
may well have to be fought without the assistance of, or even in direct
opposition to, the decisions of the United States Supreme Court. In
that unhappy event, our rights may be truly endangered.
ble absent a showing that regulated activity has a substantial effect on interstate commerce) (em-
phasis in original); Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607,
681-82 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (arguing for resurrection of the nondelegation doctrine);
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 138-53 (1978) (Rehnquist J., dissent-
ing) (designation of building as official landmark by city constituted taking of property without
just compensation in violation of the filth amendment); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833 (1976) (upholding states' rights under the tenth amendment). See also Justice
O'Connor's opinion in FERC v. Mississippi, 102 S. Ct. 2126, 2145-57 (1982) (O'Connor, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) (tenth amendment requires invalidation of Titles I and III
of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 52 U.S.L.W.
4886, 4895 (U.S. June 26, 1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (disclo-
sure of data by Environmental Protection Agency constituted a taking of property without just
compensation in violation of the fifth amendment).
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